This article defines compliance-oriented regulation not as regulatory policy tied to a particular enforcement strategy but as (a) an outcome-based approach to total regulatory design (from initiation of regulation to enforcement) (b) in which the likely interaction of public regulation with preexisting "regulatory space" to produce compliance or noncompliance with regulatory objectives is a central consideration.
This article uses evidence on a variety of regulatory innovations to show that compliance-oriented regulatory policy must be a holistic process based on choosing strategies by reference to whether they will contribute to the outcome of compliance with regulatory goals. This approach sidesteps the usual distinction drawn between compliance-and deterrence-oriented regulatory regimes and emphasizes that compliance-oriented regulation is more than an issue of enforcement strategy. I also argue that it is through seeking to understand, manipulate, and work with the interaction between public regulation and preexisting regulatory space (see Hancher & Moran, 1989; Scott, 1998; Shearing, 1993 ) that compliance-oriented regulatory policy makers seek to maximize compliance with regulatory goals. A proper understanding of compliance-oriented regulation therefore involves not just an understanding of regulators' strategy but of market and management orderings, private compliance constituencies and gatekeepers, and internal organizational regulatory systems. In-house corporate compliance systems are currently an important place in which this interaction occurs. The final sections of this article therefore explain how regulatory innovations are encouraging the proliferation of corporate compliance systems and what factors are likely to help make corporate compliance systems effective at accomplishing desirable outcomes.
REGULATORY SPACE AND COMPLIANCE-ORIENTED REGULATION REGULATORY SPACE
The definitive feature of compliance-oriented regulation is that it is regulation designed to solve a problem on the basis of evidence about what is likely to achieve the regulatory objective. This leads to the recognition that the outcome of pubic regulation is likely to be conditioned by preexisting and potential indigenous normative orderings in the target population including regulatees' capacity to comply, managerial and cultural orderings within organizations, self-regulatory capacities of industry associations, and gatekeeper roles played by third parties including professionals (e.g., auditors, lawyers, safety professionals), standards-setting organizations, insurance companies, rating agencies, and others. The distinctive characteristic of compliance-oriented regulation is that it recognizes that regulated entities already contain or exist within regulatory space (Hancher & Moran, 1989; Scott, 1998; Shearing, 1993) . It takes seriously the interaction of public regulation with preexisting regulatory space.
Regulatory space is a metaphor that emphasizes that the state must always compete with other regulatory orderings for social control in any particular circumstance. It recognizes that wherever we look in society, all sorts of formal and informal social controls already exist-family norms, school rules, common business practices, corporate operating procedures, gang subcultures. Public agencies that seek to regulate members of society never issue their regulation onto a blank slate. Rather, it enters a social space in which all sorts of other orderings already "regulate" how people behave. As Shearing (1993) explains it, One way of thinking about this is to imagine regulation as taking place in a space in which different regulatory schemes operate simultaneously. The occupants of this space may change but it is never empty. If one set of regulatory influences diminishes this simply changes the relationship between occupants of this space. (p. 72) This perspective fits in with a broader concern in political theory and policy studies with the role of the contemporary state vis à vis the market and civil society. Thus, a number of scholars have recognized that a unique concern of the contemporary state is to govern by "the devising of forms of regulation which permit and facilitate natural regulation" (Gordon, 1991, p. 19 ; see also Garland, 1997) . The popular U.S. book Reinventing Government (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) picked up this theme in the aphorism that the role of government should be to "steer" not "row." The idea was that government should leverage its resources by facilitating spontaneously occurring activity in markets and civil society to help accomplish public policy objectives. This approach to governance has had a direct impact on regulatory practice and theorizing. In the United States, for example, the "re-inventing regulation" program (Geltman & Skroback; , Nesterczuk, 1996 aims to control regulatory inflation and ensure that the design of regulation and regulatory enforcement strategy meets its goals in an effective and efficient way that maximizes voluntary or natural compliance with policy objectives from the beginning.
A number of scholars predict that the "new" regulatory state (see J. Braithwaite, 2000; Parker, 1999a Parker, , 1999b will turn from being predominantly concerned with compliance with technical rules to a concern with accomplishing substantive compliance with regulatory goals by whatever means is appropriate and feasible including enforced self-regulation, incentive-based regimes, harnessing markets, conferring private rights and liabilities, and relying on third-party accreditation to standards and insurance-based schemes (Baldwin, 1997; Grabosky, 1995; Manning, 1987; Sparrow, 1994) . The objective will be to steer corporate conduct toward public policy objectives in the most effective and efficient way rather than fruitless expenditure of government and business resources on traditional styles of regulation that ignore the effects of indigenous regulatory orderings.
COMPLIANCE-ORIENTED REGULATION
In the literature on regulation, the "compliance" approach to regulation is often identified with the use of persuasive and collaborative strategies by regulators to win regulatee's cooperation. For example, Friedrichs (1995, p. 284) distinguishes compliance, which uses persuasion and cooperation, from deterrence, which involves prosecution and punishment. A body of empirical studies, particularly from Britain, has shown that in practice certain individual tax, environmental, financial, and occupational health and safety officials have often relied on education, persuasion, and cooperation rather than deterrence to persuade businesses to preventively comply with regulatory goals in certain circumstances (e.g., J. Braithwaite, 1985; Hawkins, 1984; Hutter, 1997) . As a normative matter, arguments in favor of cooperative and persuasive strategies are based on the assumption that business firms will see that they need to develop a long-term relationship with regulators. The firm may therefore be persuaded to "forgo short-term temptations to cheat on an agency that cannot easily monitor its activities" through techniques such as "negotiating compliance requirements sensitive to the particular characteristics of the firm" and "avoiding unnecessary short-term confrontations" as long as the regulators' long-term goals are being achieved (Scholz, 1994, pp. 425-426) . For example, Bardach and Kagan (1982) , commentators on U.S. regulation, take the view in their influential Going by the Book that "good and bad apples are intermixed in the regulatory population" (p. 66) and that with regulatory goals; citizen complainants and internal corporate compliance staff use the threat of inspectors' visits to push for adherence to regulation; and a relatively small number of well-publicized severe punishments for regulatory noncompliance act as a sufficient deterrent. (p. 162) Ayres and Braithwaite's (1992) theory of responsive regulation provides a robust game theoretic analysis of the conditions in which such cooperation is likely to succeed. As Scholz (1994) explains, in theory the strength of this strategy is that over time, the firm persuades more and more firms to cooperate. The agency can then focus more of its limited prosecutorial resources on the fewer and fewer bad firms, thereby increasing penalties and the incentives of firms to cooperate. Given greater incentives, the agency can insist on higher levels of performance by cooperative firms as the regulation becomes more accepted by the business community. (p. 442; but see Scholz, 1994, p. 443 for a discussion of the limits to this strategy)
Critics sometimes deride compliance-oriented regulatory policies on the grounds that companies will only do "the right thing" to the extent it is in their self-interest to do so. Tombs (1990, 1997; Tombs; , for example, argue that because all corporations have profit maximization as their main goal, they will always be "amoral calculators" who only ever comply with regulatory requirements when the penalties are heavy enough to ensure their calculations come up with the correct answer. Incentives for self-regulation, they argue, must therefore be backed up by punitive enough forms of regulation in the public sphere to make sure companies consistently do their sums right. Pearce and Tombs seem to see compliance-oriented regulation as relying solely on incentives for voluntary compliance or a persuasive, educative approach to inspections. But logically, compliance-oriented regulatory design must incorporate monitoring and enforcement of compliance; otherwise, regulators cannot meaningfully and discriminately apply incentives, persuasion, and cooperation to organizations that are complying or attempting in good faith to comply. It is impossible to argue with the logic of Pearce and Tombs's argument that strategies that seek to encourage voluntary compliance should be backed up by more punitive sanctions.
However, this is not a simple matter of abandoning the quest for compliance and switching to deterrent sanctions as soon as persuasion fails. Compliance-oriented regulation is not a matter of substituting persuasion and cooperation for inspections and penalties. It is a holistic approach toward regulation in which mixes of regulatory strategies appeal to the complexity and variety of motivations underlying compliance. The emphasis 534 ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY / November 2000 is on the substantive policy objectives of the regulation and whether the regulatory policy instruments chosen are capable of accomplishing those objectives, not on compliance with rules that may or may not be effective at achieving the desired result. Compliance-oriented regulation, therefore, is a total package in which all the factors of regulatory rule making, monitoring, and enforcement are designed to elicit a particular regulatory objective by defining and analyzing a problem, designing a regulatory solution tailored to the target population, and monitoring and enforcing its implementation. Indeed, the elements of compliance-oriented regulation can be expressed in the following seven principles that clearly incorporate monitoring and enforcement:
1. problem identification and analysis, 2. harness private capacity to secure compliance through alternatives to public regulation, 3. use process or outcome-based regulation where possible to maximize voluntary compliance, 4. rewards and incentives for high/voluntary compliance, 5. informed monitoring for noncompliance, 6. dialogue and restorative justice when voluntary compliance fails, and 7. tit-for-tat enforcement when restorative justice fails.
These principles are interwoven into the discussion that follows. In the following two subsections, I discuss two cornerstones of effective compliance-oriented regulatory innovation. The first is the data collection and analysis processes of problem identification, analysis, and monitoring that is essential to Stages 1 and 5 above. The second is the distinctive enforcement style of principles 6 and 7 of compliance-oriented regulation.
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION, ANALYSIS, AND MONITORING
Compliance-oriented regulation aims at maximizing the "leverage" of government resources and activities by strengthening the factors working in favor of compliance and by weakening or eliminating those working against. This requires the ability to analyze the various factors that will determine whether regulatory policy instruments can achieve their ultimate objectives in the target population. Compliance considerations should be designed into policy making and regulation from the beginning. Compliance issues cannot just be part of an enforcement strategy tacked on the end. Ex ante compliance analysis ensures that policy makers and regulation drafters consider what policy objectives they actually want to achieve, whether it is feasible to achieve that, and if so the best way to do so. It seeks Parker / REINVENTING REGULATION 535 to avoid reflexive regulation making that accomplishes nothing. Once regulation is in place, ex post compliance analysis helps governments evaluate regulation and determine whether it should be maintained, repealed, or amended by asking whether it is doing the work it is supposed to be doing. If regulation is to be maintained, compliance analysis allows regulators to determine where resources such as information, advice, monitoring, and sanctions should be targeted to achieve the desired policy objectives.
Because regulatory agencies cannot enforce every rule or cover every problem, the use of information and risk analysis to focus on high-priority problems can make an impact on compliance. For example, one dramatic way in which innovative information management combined with risk assessment and prioritization was used to increase compliance outcomes was a U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) experiment initiated in 1993 in Maine. The Maine OSHA office used its databases to identify the 200 employers with the highest number of injuries in their area. Each was given work-site-specific injury and illness profiles and then given a choice: Either they could use OSHA's help to survey hazards and correct and implement work-site safety systems or else they would be targeted for more frequent traditional comprehensive inspections because of their risk prioritization. According to OSHA, total workers compensation claims dropped by 35% in those work sites during the program. A total of 182 employers identified 95,800 hazards and abated 55,200 of them (in comparison with the 36,780 that OSHA inspectors had discovered and cited in the previous 8 years at those sites). At least 320 work-site health and safety committees were established. Nearly 60% of employers reduced their injury and illness rates even as fines and inspections diminished (OSHA, 1998; Sparrow, 1996) .
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Although compliance-oriented regulation requires knowledge of compliance trends so that governments and regulators can identify and prioritize problem areas and evaluate whether regulatory solutions have had the desired effect, most governments find it very difficult to collect aggregate and systematic data on compliance trends. Few governments and regulators have consistently collected compliance rates or assessed the effects of regulatory interventions on social phenomena over time (e.g., environmental results, health effects, decline in injury rates). Reliable data on compliance trends over time are very difficult to collect for a number of reasons. First, existing statistics on regulatory actions such as enforcement and inspections are an inadequate basis for drawing conclusions about compliance trends because compliance rates cannot be derived from a focused or biased inspection program, and almost all current enforcement and/or inspection programs are necessarily focused, biased, or not comprehensive for practical reasons. A second reason that it is difficult to collect reliable data on compliance rates is that regulatory inflation (growth in amount of regulation) and regulatory instability (changes in regulation) make it extremely difficult to draw conclusions about compliance trends over time. Actions or behaviors that were legal at one time become illegal at another so that the compliance goalpost is continuously moving. Perceptions that rates of compliance are decreasing may reflect the fact that the amount or unpredictability of regulation is increasing over time rather than that business is doing less to comply over time. It is possible that business compliance is increasing but that regulation is increasing or changing at an even greater rate, leaving a "compliance lag" that creates the impression (but not necessarily the reality) of less compliance. In other words, in a context of regulatory inflation, the overall rate of compliance can be falling even while the compliance "effort" by regulated enterprises is static or increasing. Third, governments and regulators also face a host of technical problems with measuring regulatory impacts or effects: Impact measures are problem specific and therefore difficult to aggregate into overall compliance trends. Causality is usually impossible to prove and disaggregate from the effects of other factors (such as general economic conditions). The difficulty of measuring things that did not happen makes it particularly difficult to measure the impacts of regulations that prohibit or are aimed at preventing undesirable events.
Just as compliance-oriented regulatory design begins with defining and analyzing the regulatory problem by reference to the external target population, so it must use monitoring to determine whether regulatory design is having its desired effect on the target population. One important way of matching monitoring to compliance-oriented regulatory design is to use the information collected about the regulatory problem to develop a risk-based approach to targeting inspections. Here, regulators are beginning to decide when and where to do inspections by analysis of data on where risks of noncompliance are likely to be highest. Because not all regulated entities can be monitored or inspected all the time, a rational system for deciding which to target when can make a significant difference to compliance. Regulatees can be tiered according to size (number of employees; operating revenues, assets, market share) or other factors (degree of risk, ability to comply, geographic location, level of government funding).
For example, there is evidence that tiering monitoring activities according to size has had significant effects in improving tax compliance. In Uruguay, Bolivia, and Sri Lanka, the percentage of stop-filers among the approximately 1,000 largest taxpayers dropped from 10% to 1% with the establishment of large-taxpayer units during the period from 1987 to 1991. In Argentina, the Two Thousand Taxpayer System or DOS-MIL was established in 1991 to monitor the 900 largest taxpayers in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area. During the period 1990 to 1994, VAT collection rose from 2.1% of GDP to 6.3% of GDP (Silvani & Baer, 1997) . A number of British financial regulators have developed quite sophisticated models for tiering regulatory and inspection requirements for financial institutions according to assessments of risk. For example, the Investment Management Regulatory Organisation (IMRO) (a frontline regulator formerly recognized by the Financial Services Authority in England and now superseded by a new regulatory regime) successfully piloted the relative risk assessment model to determine the degree of risk to investors that a firm may generate. The assessment is based on the inherent risks of the products sold or managed by the firm, the capital base of the firm, the experience and ability of the management and staff of the firm, and the attitude of the firm toward investor interest and compliance issues including the standard of the firm's compliance system. Firms were rated on a 3-point scale solely for IMRO use and their rating used to determine how frequently IMRO inspectors would visit firms and how closely they monitored their activities (Fry, 1997, p. 350-351; IMRO, 1997) .
COMPLIANCE-ORIENTED REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT
In an unusually rigorous study, Burby and Paterson (1993) compared cooperative enforcement with sanction-oriented enforcement for improving compliance with North Carolina State environmental regulation. Their research shows how deeply interwoven regulatory design and choice of enforcement strategy are in their ultimate effects on compliance. Their study found that while deterrence of violations through monitoring and inspections stimulates compliance with both specification and performance standards, building commitment and capacity to obey the law through a cooperative approach to enforcement has much more impact on the degree of compliance attained for performance standards than for specification standards. (p. 754) 3 In their study, compliance-oriented regulatory design in the form of performance standards was more effectively enforced by cooperative strategies that were in turn backed up by potential application of deterrent sanctions than by the application of deterrent sanctions alone. Where regulatory design was more traditional-specification rules-traditional deterrent enforcement alone was no less effective than adding cooperative enforce-538 ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY / November 2000 ment. How then can monitoring and enforcement be designed to be compliance oriented?
Compliance-oriented regulation is aimed at providing incentives and encouragement to voluntary compliance and nurturing the ability for private actors to secure compliance through self-regulation, internal management systems, and market mechanisms where possible rather than automatically using punishment for breaches of the rules as the first regulatory tool (see discussion below). When organizations do fail to comply in the first instance, a compliance-oriented regulatory approach would attempt to restore or nurture compliance rather than reverting immediately to a purely punishment-oriented approach. In criminal process, "restorative justice" requires an offender to confront his or her responsibility for wrongdoing by facing his or her victim/s and together resolving how to put the wrong right (for example, by paying restitution or doing community service). Restorative justice gives the offender a chance to be restored back into full citizenship in the community on remedying the wrong. The aim is not only to provide a better remedy for the victim than imprisonment or a fine would provide but also to help transform the offender into a more law-abiding person in the future. This is often achieved by enlisting the support of members of both the victim's and offender's families and communities to support victim and offender in the restorative process (Cragg, 1992; Galaway & Hudson, 1990; Marshall, 1985; Messmer & Otto, 1992; Van Ness, 1986) .
Although the evidence on the effectiveness and fairness of restorative justice for individual offenders is still being evaluated, there is good evidence that restorative justice is an effective approach to corporate law breaking (J. Braithwaite, 1999) . One study found that in the United Kingdom, the mines with the best safety records are those that thoroughly include everyone concerned (workers, management) after accidents and near accidents to reach consensual agreement on what must be done to prevent recurrence of the accident or near accident and discuss safety results with workers even when there was no near accident (J. Braithwaite, 1985, p. 67) . Another example of the success of restorative justice processes in regulating safety is the self-regulatory Institute of Nuclear Power Operators (INPO), which was set up after the Three Mile Island accident to develop standards, conduct inspections, and investigate accidents. Safety has increased significantly since Three Mile Island across a number of indicators including data that show that scrams (automatic emergency shutdowns) per unit have declined in the United States from seven per unit in 1980 to one in 1993 (Rees, 1994) . One of the restorative regulatory mechanisms that has contributed to this success is meetings in which Parker / REINVENTING REGULATION 539 senior nuclear officials from all companies meet together, and three vice presidents give a detailed explanation of a recent accident at their utility and what went wrong:
More than a detailed explanation of an accident, it also involves "baring your soul and telling all to your peers (people that you know) that you screwed up," explains an INPO official. "You know, I'm not a Catholic, but it's probably like going to confession. In the end you'll feel better, but when you're there it's pretty difficult." . . . Within an ongoing relationship sustained by close ties (whether a family or occupational community), wrongdoing arouses the disapproval of a significant other (whether a parent or professional peer), thus invoking a sense of remorse and repentance in the wrongdoer, which leads to reacceptance (reintegration) by the significant other. Wrongdoing, shame and reintegration-that distilled to its essence, is the family [restorative] model of social control. (Rees, 1994, pp. 106-107) Makkai and Braithwaite's (1994b) cross-country evaluation of nursing home regulation and inspections has also found significant evidence for the effectiveness of restorative justice mechanisms in controlling organizational wrongdoing. For example, in one part of the study, one dimension of the level of restorative justice used in the postinspection conference held to discuss the inspection findings in 242 Australian nursing home inspections was measured. The levels of compliance found in that inspection and in the next inspection 18 to 24 months later were then compared. Where the inspection team had used restorative justice (i.e., it clearly disapproved breaches of the rules but also terminated disapproval by pointing to something positive or offering praise for moving to fix that which was disapproved), noncompliance was reduced by 39% between the first and second visits. Where inspection teams used purely negative and punitive approaches and did not also offer praise and forgiveness, noncompliance increased by 39%. Where inspection teams were purely tolerant and understanding but did not make clear their disapproval for breaches of the rule, noncompliance either increased or stayed the same.
Like Burby and Paterson's (1993) study that showed how performanceoriented regulatory design, cooperative enforcement strategies, and deterrent sanctions are interwoven, this study shows how a truly complianceoriented approach combines cooperation, persuasion, and education with strong monitoring and enforcement. Makkai and Braithwaite (1994b) concluded that the most stigmatizing inspectors manage to effect significant reductions in the compliance of the nursing homes they inspect. At the same time, tolerant and understanding inspectors who believe in saying nice things at all times are almost equally ineffective because these tolerant, understanding 540 ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY / November 2000 inspectors fail to express disapproval when the standards set down in the law are not met. The effective inspectors are those who believe in strong expressions of disapproval combined with strong commitments to burying the hatchet once such robust encounters are over, to terminating disapproval with approval once things are fixed, to tempering disapproval for poor performance on one standard with approval for good performance on other standards, to avoiding humiliation by communicating disapproval of poor performance within a framework of respect for the performer. 4 (p. 379) Restorative justice must also be backed up by the possibility of more punitive sanctions. Indeed, the evidence shows that persuasive and compliance-oriented enforcement methods are more likely to work where they are backed up by the possibility of more severe methods (J. Braithwaite, 1985; Burby & Paterson, 1993) . The idea is that regulators should engage tit for tat in restorative or persuasive enforcement strategies depending on the responses of the regulated entity. A regulator can start with persuasive or restorative strategies and then move to more punitive strategies if voluntary compliance fails. If the application of punitive sanctions succeeds in bringing about compliance, then the regulator can revert to a trusting demeanor. If it does not bring about compliance, then the regulator must invoke harsher sanctions. The wider the range of strategies (from restorative to punitive) available to the regulator, the more successful tit-for-tat enforcement is likely to be.
This principle has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically in Ayres and Braithwaite's (1992) pyramid of enforcement strategies. The pyramid is a schematic representation of the idea that instead of using their most drastic regulatory strategies first, regulators should trade on the goodwill of those they are regulating, encouraging them to comply voluntarily, using more drastic regulatory measures only when that fails and reverting to a trusting demeanor when these strategies achieve their goal: "Compliance is optimised by regulation that is contingently cooperative, tough and forgiving" (p. 51). In this model, prioritizing restorative, compliance-oriented means of regulation in time ensures that cooperative, voluntary measures are used more frequently without compromising the possibility of using harsher measures where necessary.
COMPLIANCE-ORIENTED REGULATORY DESIGN
Compliance-oriented regulation begins with rigorous identification and analysis of the facts of the problem to be regulated and faces noncompliance with enforcement mechanisms aimed at nurturing and restoring Parker / REINVENTING REGULATION 541 compliance. In between these phases, Stages 2, 3, and 4 above describe the principles of compliance-oriented regulatory design. Compliance-oriented regulation seeks to take account of the fact that state regulation is not the only player in regulatory space by seeking to coopt or even create private regulatory institutions and to push responsibility for achieving regulatory objectives onto nonstate actors through (Stage 2) harnessing private capacity to secure compliance with regulatory goals, (Stage 3) using process and outcome-based regulation to encourage compliance, and (Stage 4) using rewards and incentives for high/voluntary compliance.
HARNESS PRIVATE CAPACITY TO SECURE COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATORY GOALS
The first principle of compliance-oriented regulatory design is to attempt to harness private capacity to secure compliance with regulatory goals through (a) codes of conduct and self-regulation, (b) voluntary agreements between government and industry, (c) industry standards and internal management systems, and (d) economic instruments and market mechanisms (see Grabosky, 1995) . This approach recognizes that compliance with regulatory goals is more likely to be achieved if regulatory design works with preexistent regulatory systems or is able to foster the development of such systems.
The most basic self-regulatory schemes involve voluntary compliance with a code of conduct that includes some dispute resolution arrangement. There is little systematic evidence on the effectiveness of self-regulatory schemes, although many individual schemes have been shown to have failed (e.g., Jeffcott & Yanz, 1998; Pearce & Tombs, 1990) . The British Office of Fair Trading (OFT) (1998) has recently reevaluated its scheme for encouraging voluntary codes of conduct on the basis that "successive monitoring exercises revealed patchy levels of compliance and fairly widespread ignorance or apathy among traders and the public alike" (p. 13). However, there is evidence that some self-regulatory schemes have been effective at improving regulatory goals: One is the Chemical Industry Association's Responsible Care scheme, which started with the Canadian Chemical Producers' Association and now operates in 41 countries and reaches around 88% of the global chemical industry (OECD, 1997b, pp. 13-20) . Since 1987, the U.S. chemical industry claims to have used Responsible Care to reduce releases of toxic chemicals to the environment by 49%, reduced disposal in deep wells by 46%, and reduced off-site transfer for treatment and disposal by 56% (Gunningham, 1998) .
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It seems likely that self-regulatory schemes work best when there is strong governmental and community interest in checking that they are working well coupled with the potential threat of regulation, as in the Responsible Care scheme, and where self-regulatory design includes a fair and efficient dispute resolution system involving an external or independent ombuds office.
The use of voluntary agreements with individual companies or industry associations gives government a greater capacity to be involved in consultation, participation, and partnership with private bodies than self-regulation does. Globally, voluntary agreements are being extensively used to avoid the need for restrictive regulation and legislation in controlling greenhouse gas emissions. In this area, voluntary agreements are an attractive means of discharging international obligations to reduce emissions without imposing politically unpalatable regulation or carbon taxes. In Norway, for example, 325 companies are participating in such programs in 12 trade groups covering 80% of energy used in industry (Jutsen, 1995) . Despite Australia's recent recalcitrance over greenhouse gas emissions targets in the international arena, in 1995-1996 the threat of a carbon tax under a previous government was real enough for industry associations to initiate the idea of the Greenhouse Challenge Program. More than 100 members, including approximately 80% of enterprises in the electricity business, are now implementing plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions that will be audited by government. Their combined commitments would enable year 2000 emissions from these companies to stabilize at or below 1995 levels, which means a reduction of 16% from the "no action" level. The first annual reports that have been received confirm that this target is on track to be achieved (Greenhouse Challenge Office, 1997). Voluntary agreements seem to work well when there is potential for government and industry to agree on what needs to be done, and it is basically in industry interest to comply if government offers some quid pro quo for doing so, such as technical advice and assistance in the case of the Australian Greenhouse Challenge Program.
Third, governments can enlist the support of internal corporate management to achieve regulatory goals (safer workplaces, less pollution, consumer understanding of products, etc.) in a way that is consistent with their own individual business goals through encouraging the adoption of industry standards and internal management systems that embody regulatory goals. For example, the OFT (1998) has recently raised the possibility of replacing its endorsement of certain industry codes of conduct with industry standards for fair practice. The European Commission is also encouraging companies to improve environmental outcomes by voluntary participation in an eco-audit scheme via an eco-audit logo and accreditation of environmental auditors, standards for environmental management systems, and environmental statements published by companies (Aalders, 1993) . A number of studies, particularly in the environmental area, have purported to show that the implementation of environmental management systems can produce outcomes that are good for the environment and good for business (e.g., Elliott, 1998, p. 128; McInerney & White, 1995; Schmidheiny, 1992; but cf. Beder, 1997, p. 130) . However, the evidence suggests that implementation of internal management standards that ensure compliance with regulatory goals is likely to be patchy and weak (see Table 1 and discussion below) unless government backs them up with some sanction or incentive for implementation.
For example, since 1988 the Netherlands government has been attempting to stimulate the development and adoption of Internal Company Environmental Management systems (ICEMs), which would include internal monitoring, environmental reporting, and auditing. By 1995, only 35 companies had implemented ICEM on the basis of BS 7750 (the standard designed by the British Standards Institute) as determined by recognized and validated auditing bureaus. The government's target had been 10,000 by 1995. However, there has been some success in linking ICEM implementation with environmental permits. Companies with ICEMs of a high enough standard are entitled to obtain a more flexible environmental permit that allows them a greater degree of self-regulation and more lenient enforcement policies. An evaluation of 16 companies that had either established a link between their ICEM and their environmental permit under the Environmental Management Act of 1993 or were in the process of doing so found that in 10 of the 16 companies the link proved to be a success. The others failed because the firm asked for more flexibility than allowed or because the government eventually opted for a stricter permit (Aalders, 1993; Aalders & Wilthagen, 1997) .
A fourth way in which governments can harness private capacities to achieve regulatory goals is through market incentives such as the application of taxes, charges, subsidies, user pricing, or refund schemes to internalize externalities; or through limiting the ability of organizations to engage in an undesirable activity and making the right to do it tradable in the marketplace through tradable permits. There has been little experience to gauge the success of economic instruments in increasing achievement of regulatory goals, and measurements of their success remain difficult and controversial (Crandall, Rueter, & Steger, 1996; Levin, 1985) . Where 65% had explicit compliance standards and procedures in place; 63% had produced publications that communicated these standards and procedures to staff and management; 58% had assigned responsibility to high-level personnel to oversee compliance; 54% periodically reviewed or audited compliance program; 47% monitored systems to detect misconduct; 44% used training programs to communicate standards and procedures to staff; 41% had mechanisms to enforce compliance procedures; 38% had systems whereby employees could report misconduct without fear of retribution. Andersen (1996) Norway 100 top corporate managers 100% 31% strongly engaged in environmental, health, and safety (EHS) work; 37% medium to strongly engaged in EHS work; 32% not interested in implementing EHS actions; 29% companies with sales up to 10 million NOK had no knowledge of requirement for EHS system; 6% companies with sales of more than 100 million NOK had no knowledge of requirement for EHS system. 
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PROCESS AND OUTCOME-BASED REGULATION
Where it is not possible to harness private alternatives to public regulation, compliance-oriented regulation maximizes the possibility for voluntary compliance in the design of government-mandated rules. One way in which voluntary compliance might be increased is through using regulation to mandate the policy goal itself via broad outcome standards instead of prescribing technical rules or procedures that might be expected to result in the achievement of the goal. By focusing on results (outcomes) rather than on the means for achieving them (inputs), standards permit each regulated entity greater freedom of action to find the lowest cost or best means of complying for itself and can therefore increase compliance and innovation. The disadvantages of such an approach are that there may be uncertainty regarding what constitutes acceptable compliance, it may favor larger firms with a greater capacity to innovate over smaller firms, and it may be difficult for regulators to monitor and enforce compliance with broader standards.
There is some evidence that broad outcome-based standards are actually easier to apply, monitor, and enforce than many specific rules, especially if they have been developed in a process of dialogue and consultation between regulator and regulatee. For example, U.S. nursing homes must meet more than 500 federal standards in addition to a multitude of state standards to demonstrate they reach an appropriate level of care. By contrast, in Australia there are only 31 broad outcome-oriented standards for nursing homes that were settled consensually between industry and major stakeholders. A myriad of U.S. rules about treatments, dressings, and recording of pain problems in care plans are replaced by a single "freedom from pain" standard. Braithwaite and Braithwaite's (1995) research on the implementation of the two sets of rules showed that it is the broad Australian standards that are more reliably rated by inspector teams than the narrow and specific U.S. rules. Australian inspection teams can discuss all the standards with each other, ensure that they have collected evidence on positives and negatives for each nursing home relevant to compliance with each standard, and discuss both positives and negatives of each standard with the nursing home staff. They can also use the outcome-based standards to talk to residents and staff about how quality of Parker / REINVENTING REGULATION 547 care could be improved, and, as a result, agreed action plans to restore residents' rights to quality of care were overwhelmingly implemented. Braithwaite and Braithwaite concluded that the quality of care and compliance with the law had improved in Australia with the introduction of the 31 outcome standards. In contrast, U.S. inspection teams can only tag several standards that have not been met to raise problems. As a result, they concentrate on discussing the unmet standards.
Some innovative regulatory regimes require firms to introduce a management system aimed at achieving a desired regulatory outcome without setting any specific rules for what firms are required to do. This can produce behavior designed to prevent problems before they occur and place firms in more direct control of firm-specific hazard reduction rather than one-size-fits-all solutions worked out by government agencies. For example, process regulations are often based on requiring organizations to take a systematic approach to identifying, controlling, and minimizing risks. For example, there is a movement in both occupational health and safety and food regulation toward requiring firms to engage in their own process of hazard identification, risk assessment, and risk control to achieve safety outcomes. "HACCP" principles are being recognized internationally as a way of minimizing food adulteration risks (OECD, 1997b, pp. 41-51) .
The advantages of process regulations include that they give firms the opportunity to incorporate regulatory goals into other business goals and operating procedures, and their flexibility may make controversial regulation more politically palatable. For example, Australia's affirmative action regime fits in with business goals of good human resource management rather than imposing particular targets for equal employment. In 1986, the Australian Affirmative Action (Equal Employment Opportunity for Women) Act of 1986 (Cth) was passed mandating all companies with more than 100 employees to develop an equal employment opportunity (EEO) policy, set objectives, monitor them, and submit a report on their progress to the federal Affirmative Action Agency each year. An evaluation of compliance with the Affirmative Action Act found that 96% of those businesses registered with the Affirmative Action Agency had submitted a report to the agency as required by the act (V. Braithwaite, 1993) . Commitment to the business goal of human resources management correlated highly with both procedural compliance with the eight steps and the more substantive compliance measure of reported implementation of practices that actually accommodated women in the workplace. This suggests that regulatory design can increase the potential for compliance by fitting in with management goals (V. Braithwaite, 1993) . Other research has shown that women's managerial representation has increased at a significantly higher rate in firms covered by the legislation than in those that are not and that affirmative action programs in general have steadily improved since the regime was introduced (Affirmative Action Agency, 1998, p. 22) .
However, broad outcome-based standards are not always the most effective form of regulation. For example, international regulators of intentional oil pollution at sea found that setting an outcome standard (that no less than a certain amount of oil could be discharged) was a complete failure in compliance terms. Instead, what worked was an international regime that mandated a certain type of technology for the design of ship ballasts that made intentional oil pollution much more difficult (Mitchell, 1994, p. 171ff) . Although regulators are often criticized for mandating a particular technology rather than allowing business to reach the same outcome by whatever means suits them, in this case monitoring implementation of the technology was much easier than monitoring oil pollution at sea. Ship builders and classification societies accepted the new regime and acted as third-party enforcers, or gatekeepers, by not building and not insuring ships without the mandated technology (segregated ballast tanks). Thus, the regulatory regime created obstacles to noncompliance in the first place using deterrence as a backup and relied on nonstate actors, on whom the operators are dependent and who have no economic interest in avoiding the costs of regulation, to monitor compliance. These processes were reinforced by also requiring flag states or classification societies nominated by them to inspect tankers for required equipment during construction or retrofitting plus regular inspections afterward, a system that piggybacked on the existing inspection system used by classification societies.
REWARDS AND INCENTIVES FOR HIGH/VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE
The third principle of compliance-oriented regulatory design is to formulate rules and, particularly, monitoring and enforcement regimes to encourage compliance by providing incentives or rewards for high voluntary compliance and compliance innovations. Rewards for particularly high compliance can include a reduced burden of routine inspections, penalty discounts for minor incidents of noncompliance that do occur, simplified licenses and permits, permission to use a label or mark certifying a high level of compliance, and indemnities for voluntary disclosure and Parker / REINVENTING REGULATION 549 correction of nonfraudulent noncompliance. Rewards and incentives for a generally high compliance performance can recognize the good-faith efforts of enterprises that usually comply but occasionally inadvertently breach regulation. For example, providing a penalty reduction when noncompliance does occur, or an indemnity if the enterprise reports and corrects the violation, avoids a situation in which the regulator must take "unreasonable" enforcement action against a basically compliant enterprise.
Appropriate government and public recognition can encourage well-intentioned enterprises to become "compliance leaders." This provides models for other enterprises to follow and can pull up overall compliance performance in a market sector through dynamics of market leadership. In particular, rewards for "compliance leaders" who meet certain standards can help meet desired policy outcomes voluntarily (for example, an improvement in air quality via greater emissions reduction) without having to use unreasonable coercion with all regulated entities. Governments can also use rewards and incentives to encourage a small group of compliance leaders to enter experimental programs for new regulatory approaches (such as moving from rule-based to standard-or process-based regulation). In this way, the enterprises receive rewards for high compliance with policy objectives under the experimental regime, and governments learn from them how to practically reform existing regulatory approaches and what is feasible to expect of business. Many of the compliance innovations described in this article were first introduced to a small group of enterprises in this way. However, rewards and incentives are suitable mainly only for enterprises that are compliance leaders. They are therefore not an adequate regulatory strategy on their own because compliance laggards and enterprises that act in bad faith will still require traditional enforcement and punitive sanctions. In most situations, when using rewards and incentives, regulators must also be careful that the requirements enterprises must meet to qualify for rewards be kept relevant and move up as overall compliance performance in an industry sector moves up.
One well-established example of how rewards and incentives can improve socially desirable outcome is OSHA's Voluntary Protection Program (VPP). Under this program, OSHA recognizes outstanding achievement by companies that successfully integrate a comprehensive safety and health program into their total management system. The program was adopted by OSHA in 1982 and now covers about 214,000 employees at 370 sites throughout the United States. Applicants to VPP must demonstrate in writing that their occupational safety and health compliance program includes management commitment and employee involvement, work-site-based job hazard analysis including baseline surveys of working conditions throughout the facility, hazard prevention and control, and safety and health training. The process also requires follow-up using annual program evaluations, verified by OSHA on-site every 1 to 5 years. Employers with exceptional programs receive special recognition including the lowest priority for enforcement inspections, the highest priority for assistance, appropriate regulatory relief, and penalty reductions of up to 100%. For other firms, a sliding scale of incentives is offered. In 1991, of the 178 companies in the program, 9 sites had no injuries at all. Overall, VPP sites' injury incidence rates were 55% below expected average for similar industries. Thirty-one had no lost workday injuries, and overall the companies were 51% below expected lost workday injuries in similar industries. Many sites boasted production improvements, reduced absenteeism, and lower workers' compensation costs (Feitshans, 1997) .
Another way that regulatory design can provide incentives for high voluntary compliance is by providing that the existence of an effective compliance system will provide companies or individuals with a reduction of penalty if they are found to have breached the law. The most significant development of this kind is the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines for organizations (see Gruner, 1994) . These guidelines were promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC) (a judicial agency) and went into effect in absence of congressional action. Companies with good compliance programs (defined by certain elements in the guidelines) are given decreased fines when they commit an offense. Those that do not have a compliance program in place are placed on probation and required to implement one. This has spread to many other regulators who are now willing to not prosecute at all if an enterprise can show it has a program in place that meets the USSC guidelines. The guidelines have had a significant impact on the implementation of compliance policies among U.S. companies generally (irrespective of whether they have had any contact with a regulator): Surveys have found that up to 20% of companies surveyed introduced an internal system for ensuring regulatory compliance for the first time because of the guidelines and up to 45% added vigor to their internal compliance system because of the guidelines (Harvard Law Review, 1996 , p. 1787 Price Waterhouse, 1997) .
titative evidence available on the implementation of corporate compliance programs. The evidence suggests that corporate compliance programs are strongest in the areas of environmental, occupational health and safety, and financial services regulation (see, e.g., Aalders & Wilthagen, 1997, p. 421; Andersen, 1996; Genn, 1993) . EEO and affirmative action compliance policies are also widely implemented but to a lesser extent. The evidence also shows that corporate compliance systems are much more likely to be implemented by large enterprises than small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
The implementation of corporate compliance programs does not of itself necessarily represent an increase in compliance or in optimal regulatory outcomes. Indeed, it is possible that corporate compliance systems are a response to unnecessarily complex laws and high risks of private liability and bad publicity. But on the whole, the growth in adoption of corporate compliance programs illustrates a widespread acceptance among big business of the need to be seen to be responsive to, and ensure compliance with, reasonable regulatory requirements and social pressures. From the regulator's point of view, at least three factors will affect the success of these regulatory interactions within the organization: regulators' ability to nurture compliance capacity in business, the emergence of compliance professionals to act as mediators between regulators and organizations, and the development of meta-standards for internal corporate controls that help ensure the effectiveness of compliance constituencies within the organization. (Clearly, research from the point of view of corporate mangers and employees will also be helpful in understanding the impact of compliance-oriented regulation; see Parker, 1999a Parker, , 1999b 
ABILITY TO NURTURE COMPLIANCE CAPACITY
Strategic compliance-oriented regulatory design and enforcement does not necessarily reach an audience equipped to understand or effectively respond with compliance to regulatory objectives. Innovative regulatory strategies for encouraging compliance are not likely to be effective if organizations have no capacity or expertise in how to comply with regulation. Indeed, Heimer's (1996) study of the impact of law inside neonatal intensive care units shows that many organisations are organized anarchies, functioning much like garbage cans into which a variety of elements are tossed. . . . Rather than decisions being made in the "rational" way that organisation charts would suggest they are . . . , decisions instead result from the episodic coupling of key Parker / REINVENTING REGULATION 553 elements that co-exist semi-autonomously in organisations. Which decisions get made depends on what participants happen to be there at the time, what is identified as a problem needing a solution, what solutions are available in the organization, and consensus that a choice point has arrived and it is time to make a decision. (p. 44) Indeed, one of the main advantages of implementation of a compliance system from a corporate management point of view is that it will improve controls, efficiency, and the rationality of certain processes within the organization. Studies of organizational decision making and ethics have shown that organizational processes often tend to result in decisions in which the group decides on action that is more risky and unethical than any one of them individually would have chosen and that people often remain committed to group policies even when they are obviously working badly and have unintended consequences (Sims, 1994, p. 50 ; also see Gioia, 1992) . Compliance-oriented regulatory strategy should foster "ethical intelligence" within organizational processes. Therefore, one of the more strategic things regulators can do to increase compliance is to nurture organizational capacity to comply through education, assistance, offering consultancy services, and encouraging the growth of compliance professionals with specialist expertise in the area.
SMEs are often particularly low in compliance often because they lack capacity (such as specialized staff) to comply. Assistance targeted at SMEs may therefore bear fruit. For example, OSHA's Consultation program is a broad network of occupational safety and health services that provide a free source of information and technical assistance targeted at SME employers (those with no more than 250 employees) who request help in establishing and maintaining a safe and healthful workplace. The comprehensive assistance available includes an appraisal of all mechanical systems, physical work practices, and environmental hazards of workplaces and all aspects of employer's present job safety and health programs. According to OSHA, the consultation program has helped identify and control more than 500,000 workplace safety and health hazards. The program is popular with SMEs because of the government's willingness to pay for expert services that would otherwise cost thousands of dollars. The consultation program is also completely separate from OSHA's inspection program, and the consultant pledges confidentiality provided the employer agrees to correct in a timely manner any serious hazards uncovered during the consultation visit. In an independent survey conducted for OSHA in 1995, employers who had received onsite consul-554 ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY / November 2000 tation visits indicated very high levels of satisfaction with the service provided (Weinberg, 1996) .
REGULATORY COMMUNITY AND COMPLIANCE PROFESSIONALISM
For targeted monitoring and enforcement, incentives for voluntary compliance, and voluntary agreements to be effective, there must be a meaningful avenue of engagement between regulator and regulatee; there must be some medium through which information can flow and dialogue can occur. Regulators must receive information about whether compliance programs put in place to stave off more harsh sanctions are effective and in line with legal standards. Regulatees must understand what regulators and communities require and why regulators have taken particular strategic enforcement decisions. They must have enough in common to understand when escalation up the pyramid will fit regulatory goals and when escalation is not necessary. Indeed, compliance-oriented regulation generally relies on the assumption that regulatory messages are communicated into a world of shared bonds and shared understandings in which companies can effectively respond to regulatory signals, and the parties deliberate effectively about their responses to them, which, in turn, creates shared commitments to regulatory goals. Regulators and regulatees need to be part of the same "community" to have continuing relationships and the same basic understanding of the meanings and goals of regulatory action (see Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Black, 1997, pp. 30-38; Meidinger, 1987, p. 365 ).
An emerging compliance profession can act as a medium of regulatory community if regulators are willing to engage with them and can also act as a pool of compliance expertise that can be translated into corporate compliance capacity. The expansion of compliance and risk management programs in corporations has opened a new professional jurisdiction in which practitioners who identify themselves as "compliance professionals" is emerging. The new occupation spans nonlawyers including human resource managers, auditors, ex-lawyers who now see themselves as compliance managers, and lawyers who specialize in compliance issues. The emergence of the new occupation is evident in a sprinkling of new professional associations and institutions that cater to their interests and concerns: the U.S. Ethics Officers Association, which was formed in 1992 and had grown from 30 to more than 500 members by 1998 (Driscoll, Parker / REINVENTING REGULATION 555 Hoffman, & Murphy, 1998, p. 49; Driscoll, Hoffman, & Petry, 1995, p. 117) ; the compliance section of the Practising Law Institute; and the Association of Compliance Professionals for Australia (which has grown to approximately 400 members since it was established in mid-1996; Parker, 1999a) . Particular areas of regulation, in which there is a history of significant regulation, have also encouraged the growth of specialist groups of compliance professionals. The Society of Consumer Affairs Professionals in Business in the United States, Australia, and Europe was set up to provide professional culture, support, and knowledge for people employed by organizations to handle consumer complaints. The Regulatory Affairs Professionals Society in the pharmaceutical industry with 4,000 members worldwide is another example of such an organization. The expansion of civil rights into the workplace has led to the creation of a whole group of human resources professionals who specialize in occupational health and safety, affirmative action, and EEO compliance (V. Braithwaite, 1992; Edelman, Erlanger, & Lande, 1993, p. 501; Parker, 1999b) . Occupational health and safety regulation has also generated a professional safety engineering movement in manufacturing and mining workplaces (Rees, 1988, p. 228) . Most banks and securities trading firms now have compliance divisions that are distinct from their legal departments. Compliance officers in the U.S. securities industry began to meet as early as the 1960s, with their 1996 conference having more than 2,200 participants (McCaffrey & Hart, 1998) . In Britain, the introduction of a new regulatory system under the 1986 Financial Services Act encouraged most firms carrying on investment business to introduce a devoted compliance function (Weait, 1994, p. 381) : The Compliance Institute and Securities Houses Compliance Officers Group were both established as professional associations for compliance managers in the finance and banking area and now have a combined membership of more than 1,000.
Some empirical evidence shows that flexible compliance-oriented programs are more likely to succeed where the regulated community includes compliance professionals who can act as a go-between for regulator and business so that business understands how to comply with regulatory goals and can communicate ideas for more innovative and flexible regulatory mechanisms back to regulators. Rees's (1988) evaluation of the Californian branch of OSHA experiment with the Cooperative Compliance Program between 1979 and 1984 found that the growth of safety management professionalism was crucial to compliance with regulatory goals. The program authorized labor-management safety committees on seven large construction sites to assume many of OSHA's regulatory responsibilities (such as conducting inspections and investigating complaints), whereas OSHA ceased routine compliance inspections and pursued a more cooperative relationship with these companies. During the program, accident rates ranged from one third lower to five times lower than comparable company projects, and the satisfaction of workers, management, and government participants with the program was high. The evaluation found that this approach succeeded mainly because it strengthened the preexistent job-site safety programs in ways that traditional regulatory strategies could not. The voluntary job-site safety programs in turn had been promoted and implemented by safety management professionals, a professional specialization promoted by the American Society of Safety Engineers. The existence of safety management professionals within the companies also allowed the labor-management and regulator-management communication necessary for the program to succeed.
An evaluation of compliance with the Australian affirmative action regime found that the degree of professionalism of EEO officers, especially their professional networking with other EEO professionals and with the EEO agency, was positively correlated with procedural and substantive compliance with the requirements of the regulation (V. Braithwaite, 1992) . Similarly, in another study of corporate compliance with U.S. civil rights laws, Edelman (1990) found that an important source of diffusion of due process protections was the professionalized practices of personnel officers and the establishment of personnel departments that saw compliance as part of their professional function and therefore provided a direct channel through which models of employee rights implementation could enter the organization and created an internal constituency for the elaboration and enforcement of employee rights. McCaffrey and Faerman (1994) conclude from their study of self-regulation in the U.S. securities industry that the institutionalization of regulatory occupations within industry (in this case, financial compliance officers) is one of the main conditions in which self or "shared" regulation is most likely to be effective so long as the law strengthens the position of the compliance staff. In a completely different situation involving hospital neonatal intensive care units, Heimer (1996 p. 37) concludes that the law's shadow is likely to be "densest" within organizations when "the law's shadow largely coincides with the shadow cast by professional bodies." She goes on to argue that "professions are simultaneously the organisational participants responsible for altering the scripts or routines of organisations and the carriers of legitimacy." They legitimize organizations by acting as "sentinels" tracking the organization's external environment, including legal and regulatory messages, and adapting organizational systems to respond to those messages appropriately.
STANDARDS FOR COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND CORPORATE STRUCTURES
Finally, regulators and regulatees must share some common standards for voluntary compliance. Edelman's work on corporate EEO polices suggests that many companies will be highly motivated to preserve legitimacy by responding to external norms and setting up compliance programs, but these will not necessarily reflect legal norms in substance (Edelman et al., 1993) . Regulators therefore need to develop some standards for compliance systems and internal corporate structures and monitor the compliance programs and functions that are being put in place; otherwise, compliance will be a sham.
One of the most significant factors influencing the effectiveness of a compliance program is whether the officer responsible for its implementation holds sufficient formal or informal clout within the organization to ensure that compliance policies are followed and ferret out breaches (J. Braithwaite & Murphy, 1993) . For example, one study of the internal compliance systems of the five American coal-mining companies with the lowest accident rates for the industry showed that one of the factors they had in common was that they gave a lot of informal clout and top management backing to their safety inspectors (J. Braithwaite, 1985, p. 65 ). At the most basic level, this means being appointed at a senior enough level to earn respect within the hierarchical structure of the corporation. But even where formal clout is lacking or is not sufficient, savvy compliance officers find ways to appropriate clout. Clearly, the best way to achieve clout is through the direct support of the senior management, preferably the managing director himself or herself. As McCaffrey and Hart (1998) conclude from their study of internal compliance systems on Wall Street, anyone who looks at broker-dealer firms in any detail will be struck by how internal politics and managerial styles produce regulatory differences across them. Those working in legal and compliance offices have professional and personal stakes in being taken seriously within the firm. How successful they are in this depends on how three issues are handled. First, how well do they convince enough powerful actors in the firm that legal and compliance "adds value" to it? Second, do they establish a reputation as competent, reasonable, and respectable "insiders"? Third, how strongly does upper management support them and internal controls generally? (p. 157) In leading corporate compliance systems, the chief compliance manager reports directly to the board or a board audit or compliance committee.
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In at least one Australian company, the chief compliance manager shares the same protection in employment as the chief financial officer: The compliance manager cannot be fired or even resign voluntarily without the matter going to a meeting of the board in which directors can satisfy themselves that the firing or resignation is not occurring for the wrong reasons. Similarly, in that company the chief compliance manager must report to the board the circumstances in which any of his or her staff resign or are fired from their compliance positions.
5
If the effectiveness of compliance officers depends on certain structural conditions within the corporation such as seniority, independence, and appropriate reporting relationships, then for compliance-oriented regulation, issues of corporate constitutionalism will be fundamental. Ensuring that a variety of different constituencies within the corporation have a voice should be an important priority because the new regulation has to rely on the ability of internal constituencies to reform corporate cultures from within. Just as various conventions have grown up to protect the independence of auditors and general counsel, so should the place of other constituencies within the corporation that might hold it to important public values be protected. This means that it is important to institutionalize, indeed constitutionalize, the compliance function through the role of general counsel, the Board Audit Committee, compliance committees, and other checks and balances. For example, in Australia the 1998 Managed Investments Act requires Australian funds managers to implement a compliance program and a compliance committee that is responsible for it. Compliance scholars could therefore connect with progressive corporate law scholarship on the democratic reform of corporate structures beyond the shareholders (see, e.g., Bottomley, 1997 Bottomley, , 1999 Chayes, 1960) .
CONCLUSION
I have argued here that compliance-oriented regulation is concerned with an outcome defined by regulatory objectives. "Compliance" has been taken to mean compliance with a regulatory goal, not compliance with a set of technical rules. As Shearing (1993) writes, "policy makers should be very wary of an approach that regards compliance with rules whether achieved through cooperation or coercion as hallmarks of sound regulatory practices. Regulatory policy should be goal rather than rule oriented" (p. 75). The paradox for business is that in one sense, compliance with a broad regulatory objective is much harder than even the toughest set of Parker / REINVENTING REGULATION 559 rules imposing the greatest paperwork burden because it requires thorough internalized commitment to showing regulatory responsibility in changing circumstances, not just ticking off a set of boxes. Similarly, for the regulator there is a paradox. Compliance-oriented regulation can seem weaker, perhaps less expensive, and certainly less aggressive than other styles of regulation. In fact, a truly compliance-oriented approach to regulation would include defining objectives, tailored rule design and implementation, targeted monitoring, and restoration and enforcement of compliance. It intrudes into private normative orderings in all its phases and requires understanding of and engagement with the intimate details of regulatees' characteristics, attitudes, and operations. Such a holistictailored approach is likely to be neither easy, cheap, nor, if effectively implemented, weak.
For both regulator and regulatee, however, there is a particular danger that compliance rhetoric will be used merely to "manage appearances." As Shearing (1993) writes, Therefore regulatory space is a marketplace of assurances in which multiple guarantors often compete with each other for the confidence of persons who are faced with decisions as to where and how to act. Also regulators face temptation to be content with creating appearances that will promote confidence and to be less concerned with ensuring that this confidence is actually warranted. . . . Policy should be sensitive to the danger of permitting appearance management to "capture" the regulatory process. (pp. 75-76) Even at their best, corporate compliance systems are frequently an attempt to manage appearances and preserve legitimacy (Edelman et al., 1993) in response to public and government concerns while making as little real change as possible. The critics are correct in their analyses of the shortcomings of compliance-oriented policy and scholarship that focus on only one type of strategy among the whole of regulatory design and implementation. The evidence outlined here for a holistic approach to compliance is designed to provide a more robust basis for further research and debate. 
